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1.1 Introduction
Hospital care is the most prominent of several important service indus-
tries—concentrated heavily in health care, education, and the arts—in
which nonproﬁt ﬁrms account for a substantial share of total production.
Nonproﬁt ﬁrms do not, however, provide all of the nation’s hospital care;
the industry is also heavily populated with both for-proﬁt and governmen-
tal ﬁrms. The mix of ownership forms in this industry has fed a long-
standing debate among economists, sociologists, and legal scholars about
the patient and social welfare implications of ownership, with particular
attention to diﬀerences between nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt institutions. In
this vein, several studies (reviewed in Kessler and McClellan 2002) have ex-
amined the eﬀects of ownership on quality of care, operating eﬃciency,
prices, costs, and the volume of charity care. We explore here a diﬀerent but
related issue: the eﬀects of ownership on the rapidity of exit in the face of
declining demand.
In recent years, hospital care in the United States has been characterized
by rapidly falling demand, likely due in large part to technological ad-
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1980 and 1999, inpatient nonfederal days in short-stay hospitals in the
United States fell from 293,830,162 to 160,560,460, or 45.4 percent (Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics 2001, tables 1, 91). Capacity, however,
has declined signiﬁcantly less rapidly. The number of nonfederal hospital
beds fell from 1,247,188 to 938,746 over this period, or 24.7 percent (Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics, table 108).
The preponderance of the nonproﬁt form in the hospital industry may
largely explain this divergence between the rate of decline in demand and
the rate of contraction of capacity. The managers of nonproﬁt hospitals,
lacking a class of owners to whom they are accountable, face no external
pressure to maximize proﬁts, or even (like a public utility) to produce at
least a market rate of return on the ﬁrm’s invested capital. Rather, when
cash ﬂow is positive, they are free to reinvest all of it, expanding capacity
to the point where net revenues (and hence the marginal rate of return on
existing investments) is zero. And, even if cash ﬂow is negative, they are free
to maintain capacity by drawing down on accumulated net assets (which,
among nonproﬁt hospitals, are often substantial). Indeed, managers of
nonproﬁt hospitals may even feel it is their duty to behave in this fashion,
believing in good faith that all of the ﬁrm’s revenues and net assets must be
dedicated to providing the maximum amount of hospital care possible.
A natural and potentially more eﬃcient alternative would be for the hos-
pital to return its (potential) free cash ﬂow, beyond what can be reinvested
with an appropriately high social rate of return, to patients in the form of
lower prices. But for hospital managers this alternative is rendered even
less morally salient than it might otherwise be by the fact that the bulk of
hospital revenue today comes, not directly from patients, but rather from
third-party insurers. (Another alternative would be to donate net revenues
or assets to other charities with greater social need, as is sometimes done
with the proceeds from conversion from nonproﬁt to for-proﬁt form.) Re-
luctance to reduce capacity is likely to be strongly reinforced, moreover, by
pressure from a hospital’s aﬃliated staﬀ physicians, whose income may be
threatened by reduction or elimination of the hospital’s facilities (Pauly
and Redisch 1973).
To be sure, the managers of for-proﬁt ﬁrms, and particularly of broadly
held business corporations, also have at times both the incentive and the
opportunity to engage in empire building. But the market for corporate
control acts as an ultimate check on such tendencies, as demonstrated by
the numerous hostile takeovers of the 1980s, which were in part directed at
reducing overcapacity and excessive reinvestment (Jensen 1988). No simi-
lar check exists for nonproﬁt ﬁrms, which cannot be the subject of a hos-
tile takeover.
It follows that a nonproﬁt ﬁrm not only can, but might well be expected
to, maintain capacity and even expand in circumstances where its for-
46 Henry Hansmann, Daniel Kessler, and Mark McClellanproﬁt competitors choose to contract or exit the market entirely. And this
can remain true even if for-proﬁt ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more cost eﬃcient,
and even if the nonproﬁt ﬁrm receives no special subsidies (Hansmann
1996a). In short, nonproﬁt ﬁrms have a tendency to act as capital traps, in
which capital remains strongly embedded over long periods.
The social welfare implications of such behavior are theoretically inde-
terminate. On one hand, “slow” adjustment of capacity to demand may be
optimal. Altering the level of a factor of production whose costs are as
sunk as those of a hospital bed is socially costly. On the other hand, “slow”
adjustment may be socially wasteful. Maintaining a hospital bed is costly,
in both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial terms. Substantial research, starting
with Roemer (1961), has suggested that high levels of bed capacity per pa-
tient lead to longer lengths of stay and higher costs. More recent research
indicates that hospitals that treat relatively few cases of any particular type
of patient—a potential consequence of high capacity—may deliver lower-
quality care. Kessler and McClellan (2000), for example, ﬁnd that elderly
heart attack patients from markets with high levels of capacity per unit car-
diac patient experience both generally higher levels of Medicare expendi-
tures and higher mortality rates (although somewhat lower rates of cardiac
complications).
Thus, it is important to understand how ownership aﬀects capacity
choice. If ownership forms respond diﬀerently to changes in demand, then
public policies that favor one ownership form over another may aﬀect wel-
fare not just by altering the mix of ownership forms itself, but also by
aﬀecting the aggregate level of industry capacity. Moreover, identifying
diﬀerences in the response of capacity to demand by ownership type can
help distinguish among competing general models of nonproﬁt ﬁrm be-
havior.
Despite the importance of the subject, little empirical work has focused
on the impact of ownership form on capacity choice. Two studies have ex-
amined the diﬀerential supply response of nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt ﬁrms,
and of hospitals in particular, to rapid increases in demand. Both studies
found that the market share of for-proﬁt as opposed to nonproﬁt ﬁrms was
signiﬁcantly higher in areas that had recently experienced rapid growth in
population (Steinwald and Neuhauser 1970; Hansmann 1987). These stud-
ies concluded that this pattern is explained, in important part, by the diﬃ-
culties that nonproﬁt ﬁrms face in obtaining rapid access to capital.1 The
long-term pattern of development in the hospital industry, prior to the im-
plementation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966, was that the ratio of for-
proﬁt to nonproﬁt ﬁrms increased during periods of rapidly increasing de-
mand and then fell—owing, in part, to conversions from for-proﬁt to
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1. See Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998) for related work on other constraints on nonprof-
its’ ability to expand.nonproﬁt form—as demand growth slackened (Steinwald and Neuhauser
1970). The sluggish nonproﬁt supply response to increasing demand was
thus largely a short-term phenomenon.
The principal problem facing the hospital industry today, however, may
not be to hasten capacity expansion to meet growing demand, but just the
opposite: to hasten the elimination of excess capacity already in place.
Moreover, the problem is not peculiar to the hospital industry. The non-
proﬁt form frequently performs a transitional role in the early stages of a
service industry’s development, serving as an important source of produc-
tion until adequate demand-side ﬁnancing is organized and the service is
suﬃciently standardized or regulated to permit for-proﬁt ﬁrms to serve as
eﬃcient providers. After that, the nonproﬁt ﬁrms lose their special raison
d’etre, yet retain a substantial market share owing to trapped capital. Sav-
ings banking is a conspicuous example from the past (Hansmann 1996b),
health insurance and health maintenance organizations are contemporary
examples, and higher education may be an example in the future (Hans-
mann 1996a). The problem of trapped capital is generic in the nonproﬁt
sector.
We have spoken so far of the eﬀects of nonproﬁt versus for-proﬁt own-
ership on the rate of capacity adjustment, but the underlying model of be-
havior described above can explain other diﬀerences in capacity choice be-
tween ownership forms. Hospital care, like some other important services
such as education, is also provided in substantial part by governmental in-
stitutions. Supply response in general, and trapped capital in particular,
may be less of a problem for these public ﬁrms than it is for nonproﬁt ﬁrms.
A public hospital is not a nonproﬁt entity but rather a proprietary entity
with the government as the owner, and the government has other pressing
uses for its funds besides providing hospital care. Consequently, when the
private sector becomes capable of providing services formerly provided by
the government, governments may face political incentives to exit. Consis-
tent with this logic, after Medicare and Medicaid relieved much of the need
for public and nonproﬁt hospitals to provide uncompensated care, there
was substantial exit by public institutions, whose share of total beds
dropped from roughly 31 percent to 24 percent between 1971 and 1992,
while for-proﬁt hospitals simultaneously increased their market share from
6 percent to 12 percent. In striking comparison, nonproﬁt hospitals, rather
than exiting in large numbers like the public institutions, actually increased
their market share slightly during that period, from 63 percent to 64 per-
cent (Hansmann 1996a).
For similar reasons, one might expect nonproﬁt hospitals to diﬀer
among themselves in terms of supply response. The most conspicuous di-
vide in this respect is between religiously aﬃliated and nonreligious hospi-
tals. Like public hospitals, religiously aﬃliated hospitals often have an
owner of sorts, if not in the formal legal sense, then at least in the functional
48 Henry Hansmann, Daniel Kessler, and Mark McClellansense that they are commonly associated with another entity, the church,
that both exercises substantial control over them and stands to beneﬁt
from economies achieved in the hospitals’ operations (and can serve as a
source of funds and act as entrepreneur when expansion or entry is called
for). By this reasoning, religiously aﬃliated hospitals would show greater
supply response than nonreligious nonproﬁt hospitals.
In this paper we seek to test whether rates of exit from the hospital in-
dustry diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the diﬀerent forms of ownership and es-
pecially whether secular nonproﬁt hospitals, which supply the majority of
industry capacity, are much slower to reduce capacity than are other types
of hospitals. We examine the relative responsiveness of the diﬀerent types
of hospitals to changes in demand for hospital services, using changes in
the size of the elderly population as a proxy for changes in demand. We
present estimates of the eﬀect of population changes at the zip code level
between 1985 and 1994 on changes in the capacity of for-proﬁt, secular
nonproﬁt, religious nonproﬁt, and public hospitals over the same period,
holding constant metropolitan statistical area (MSA) ﬁxed eﬀects and
other 1985 baseline characteristics of residential zip codes. We decompose
the eﬀect on each ownership form’s capacity of population into four mu-
tually exclusive and exhaustive sources: changes due to opens and closes of
hospitals, changes due to conversions, changes due to mergers and spin-
oﬀs, and changes due to changes in hospitals’ bed size. We also investigate
whether the responsiveness of diﬀerent ownership forms’ capacity to pop-
ulation diﬀer according to zip codes’ baseline 1985 hospital market char-
acteristics.
Sections 1.2 through 1.4 present the statistical models, the sources of
data, and the empirical results. Section 1.5 concludes with some observa-
tions about the implications of our results for the hypothesized model of
nonproﬁt ﬁrms’ behavior described above, and for economic eﬃciency in
sectors dominated by nonproﬁt ﬁrms.
1.2 Models
For every residential zip code z 1, . . . , Zin an MSA in 1985 and 1994,
we construct a measure of the hospital capacity serving that zip code. We
assume that z is served by every nonfederal, general medical or surgical
hospital j   1, . . . , J z within 35 miles of the patient’s residence with at least
ﬁve heart attack (AMI) admissions and every large, nonfederal, general
medical or surgical teaching hospital within 100 miles of the patient’s resi-
dence with at least ﬁve AMI admissions.2 We allocate a hospital’s beds Bj
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2. We explain the reason for these a priori constraints in Kessler and McClellan (2000): Be-
cause markets for cardiac care are generally much smaller than the constraints, they are not
restrictive.to z in inverse proportion to the distance between the hospital and the cen-





where Djz is the distance from j to z for every z   1, . . . , Zj that is served by
j. We deﬁne Cz,94 analogously, and the log growth of capacity in zip code z
as dlnCz   ln(Cz,94) – ln(Cz,85). The normalizing factor
assures that for any hospital the sum across the zip codes that it serves of
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We decompose capacity in two ways to explore whether market condi-
tions and changes in demand for hospital services have diﬀerent eﬀects on
the capacity provided by hospitals of diﬀerent ownership types. First, we
decompose each residential area’s capacity by its form of ownership. We







where SNP j   1 if j is a secular nonproﬁt hospital. We deﬁne for-proﬁt ca-
pacity CFP
z,85, religious nonproﬁt capacity Cz,85
RNP, and public capacity CP
z,85
(and their associated growth rates) analogously. Estimates of the eﬀect of
market conditions and changes in demand on each ownership form’s ca-
pacity will show how diﬀerent types of organizations respond to exoge-
nous shocks.
Second, we decompose each area’s change in capacity by the source of
the change. We categorize changes in total capacity and changes in each
ownership form’s capacity as due to one or more of four exhaustive and
mutually exclusive causes: opens and closes of new hospitals, conversions
(i.e., changes in ownership status), mergers and demergers, and changes in
bed size for hospitals not experiencing any of the three changes above. We
construct an area’s (counterfactual) change in capacity due to, for ex-
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Bj,85 as its actual 1985 capacity; deﬁne each hospital’s 1994 capacity Bj,94  
Bj,85, unless the hospital opened or closed, in which case deﬁne Bj,94   Bj,94.
Then, recalculate each area’s capacity and change in capacity using these
counterfactual hospital capacities.
We model area changes in capacity as a function of 1985–94 changes in
a zip code’s Medicare enrollee population (to proxy for changes in demand
for hospital services), the 1985 demographic characteristics of each zip
code, the 1985 hospital market characteristics of each zip code, and MSA
ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, our eﬀects are identiﬁed from within–MSA changes in
population and within–MSA diﬀerences in market characteristics. We al-
low hospital capacity to respond asymmetrically to population increases
and decreases. Our basic models specify the log change in residential zip
code z’s capacity of ownership form k as a linear function of these factors:
(1) dlnCz
k    k     dlnPz
      dlnPz
    Xz  Mz  εz,
where  kis an MSA–speciﬁc constant term; dlnPz
 is z’s log change in pop-
ulation if z’s population expanded, zero otherwise; dlnPz
– is z’s log change
in population if z’s population contracted, zero otherwise; Xz is a vector of
six variables denoting the proportion of z’s population in 1985 who were
female, black, aged seventy to seventy-four, seventy-ﬁve to seventy-nine,
eighty to eighty-nine, and ninety to ninety-nine (omitted group is the pro-
portion of population that were white males aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine;
Mz is a vector of six variables denoting whether z in 1985 was in a highly
concentrated hospital market (in the top quartile of the distribution of
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl indexes) and whether z in 1985 had above-the-
median density of patients admitted to large hospitals, teaching hospitals,
hospitals that were members of multihospital systems, for-proﬁt versus
nonproﬁt hospitals, and public versus nonproﬁt hospitals;3 and εz is an in-
dependently distributed error term, with E(εzdlnP z, Xz, Mz)   0. We
weight each observation by the number of beds of ownership type k in zip
code z, Cz
k.
We reestimate equation (1) including controls for baseline 1985 beds per
capita as a control variable, to investigate the extent to which our results
are sensitive to diﬀerences in baseline capacity that are correlated with
ownership status across areas:
(2) dlnCz
k    k     dlnPz
      dlnPz
    Xz  Mz   ln Cz,85   εz.
We also estimate two expanded models to investigate whether the re-
sponsiveness of capacity to population shifts varies by 1985 baseline char-
acteristics of hospital markets. First, we estimate models that interact lnCz
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3. See Kessler and McClellan (2000, 2002) for a detailed description of how these variables
were constructed.with dlnP in order to investigate the extent to which capacity is diﬀeren-
tially responsive to demand in high- versus low-capacity areas:
(3) dlnCz    k     dlnPz
      dlnPz
      lnCz,85   dlnPz
 
    lnCz,85   dlnPz
    lnCz,85   Xz  Mz  εz
Second, we estimate models that interact Mz with dlnP z:
(4) dlnCz    k     dlnPz
      dlnPz
       Mz   dlnPz
 
    Mz   dlnPz
    Xz  Mz  εz
Estimates from this model will show, for example, the extent to which ca-
pacity of diﬀerent ownership forms responds diﬀerently to demand in
more- versus less-competitive markets.
1.3 Data
We use data from four sources. First, we use data on U.S. hospital char-
acteristics collected by the American Hospital Association (AHA). The re-
sponse rate of hospitals to the AHA survey is greater than 90 percent, with
response rates above 95 percent for large hospitals ( 300 beds). We ex-
clude rural hospitals and hospitals owned by the federal government (pri-
marily Veterans’ Administration hospitals) because the process governing
capacity decisions for these hospitals may diﬀer from those for other hos-
pitals. We analyze the capacity of only those hospitals that ever reported
providing general medical or surgical services (e.g., we exclude psychiatric
and rehabilitation hospitals from analysis). To assess hospital size and bed
capacity per patient, we use total general medical/surgical beds set up and
staﬀed, including intensive care unit (ICU), critical care unit (CCU), and
emergency beds. We classify hospitals as teaching hospitals if they report
at least twenty full-time residents.
Second, we use a hospital system database constructed from multiple
sources (see Madison 2001 for a detailed discussion). The AHA survey
contains extensive year-by-year information on hospital system member-
ship status. Our validity checking indicated that the universe of systems
and system hospitals and the timing of hospitals’ system membership, as
deﬁned by AHA, did not conform to discussion of hospital systems in the
trade press, such as Modern Healthcare. We therefore created our own sys-
tem database based on a combination of the AHA and other sources. We
classify hospitals as for-proﬁt, secular nonproﬁt, religious nonproﬁt, or
publicly owned. We classify all public hospitals as nonsystem hospitals be-
cause system membership of public hospitals in our data did not reliably
reﬂect actual transfer of control to an outside entity.
Third, we use Medicare enrollment data to calculate the size and the age,
gender, and race distribution of each nonrural zip code’s elderly popula-
52 Henry Hansmann, Daniel Kessler, and Mark McClellantion. The Health Care Financing Administration’s Health Insurance
Skeleton Eligibility Write-oﬀ (HISKEW) enrollment ﬁles include demo-
graphic information on virtually all elderly Americans, including those en-
rolled in Medicare health management organizations (HMOs), because of
the extremely high rate of take-up in the Medicare program.
Fourth, we use comprehensive Medicare claims data on the hospital
choices of virtually all elderly Medicare beneﬁciaries with heart attack in
1985, matched with the three data sources described above, to estimate a
model of patients’ demand for hospital services as a function of travel dis-
tances between patients and hospitals, the characteristics of patients, and
the characteristics of hospitals. With these estimates, we construct mea-
sures of patient ﬂows to hospitals of diﬀerent broad types (ownership sta-
tus, size, teaching status, system membership status) that are based only on
the arguably exogenous factors described above. Then we calculate a vec-
tor of six indicator variables describing the hospital market characteristics
of each zip code in 1985 as described above (see Kessler and McClellan
2000, 2002, for a detailed discussion).
Table 1.1 describes how hospital capacity under diﬀerent ownership
forms has changed over the 1985–94 period and the sources of those
changes. Table 1.1 decomposes changes in the number of hospital beds
(and the facilities experiencing changes in beds) into four exhaustive and
mutually exclusive categories: changes due to conversions (changes in
ownership status), changes due to opens and closes, changes due to merg-
ers and spinoﬀs, and changes due to changes in bed size (absent a conver-
sion, an open or close, or a merger or spinoﬀ). The most salient feature of
the hospital industry during our study period was a massive contraction in
capacity.
In percentage terms, religious nonproﬁt hospitals experienced the great-
est contraction in bed capacity (32.5 percent), with public hospitals close
behind (29.6 percent). For-proﬁt beds contracted by 21.4 percent, while
nonreligious nonproﬁt beds contracted the least, by 20 percent. These
simple percentages do not give a clear picture of relative supply response,
however, because the environments in which these four forms of ownership
are found tend to diﬀer. In particular, at the beginning of the study period,
nonproﬁt hospitals, in comparison with for-proﬁt hospitals, tended to be
concentrated in areas with unusually high levels of capacity, where the need
for reduction in capacity was presumably greatest. In results not presented
in table 1.1, the correlation coeﬃcient between Mz
5( 1 if the concentration
of for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt admissions in the zip code were above the median,
zero otherwise) and log(capacity per person in 1985) is 0.062, p 0.01, and
the correlation coeﬃcient between Mz
6 ( 1 if the concentration of public/
nonproﬁt admissions in the zip code were above the median, zero other-
wise) and log(capacity per person in 1985) is 0.025, p   0.01.
In recent years, much attention has been focused on conversions of non-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.proﬁt hospitals to for-proﬁt form—attention that has been due, in part, to
concerns about the private proﬁteering accompanying some of these con-
versions (see e.g., Sloan, Taylor, and Conover 2000). Table 1.1 suggests that
the pattern of conversion activity is not well described, however, as an over-
all shift of capacity from nonproﬁt to for-proﬁt form. Rather, table 1.1
shows that conversions were in fact a net source of increase in secular non-
proﬁt hospital beds between 1985 and 1994, and it further shows that, in
aggregate, net conversion activity in that period moved out of both public
and religious nonproﬁt hospitals and into both for-proﬁt and secular non-
proﬁt hospitals.
To provide a more reﬁned view of conversion activity, table 1.2 tabulates
the conversions in our data according to the ownership status of the hos-
pitals involved both before and after the conversion. Those data show that,
while there is a substantial number of conversions directly from secular
nonproﬁt to for-proﬁt form, there are also nearly two-thirds as many con-
versions in the reverse direction—likely as a response to declining prof-
itability. The principal net conversion activity across ownership forms is,
instead, from public hospitals to secular nonproﬁt hospitals, which ac-
counts for nearly all of the overall net increase in secular nonproﬁt hospi-
tals through conversion during the period in question.4
Table 1.3 shows how residential zip codes’ hospital capacity responds to
changes in population, according to the size of the zip codes’ MSA, and pre-
views the results of our regression models. Table 1.3 reports the 1985–94
percentage change in the four hospital ownership types’ capacity by MSA
size for fast-growing versus slow-growing MSAs. Speciﬁcally, table 1.3
groups zip codes according to the quartile of the zip codes’ urban 1985 eld-
erly population, with eighty MSAs in each quartile. Then, within each pop-
ulation quartile, each of the eighty MSAs is classiﬁed into one of two groups
of forty MSAs, depending on its 1985–94 growth in elderly population.
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Table 1.2 Sources and Products of Hospital Conversions, 1985–1994 
Ownership Status in 1994
Ownership Status in 1985 Nonproﬁt Secular Nonproﬁt Religious For-Proﬁt Public Total
Nonproﬁt secular 38 37 14 89
Nonproﬁt religious 56 8 1 65
For-proﬁt 22 5 5 32
Public 47 3 6 56
Total 125 46 51 20
4. There is, however, an important caveat to be added here. We do not count as a conver-
sion the potentially important phenomenon of nonproﬁt hospitals’ contracting out manage-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 1.3 shows that, in the 2nd and 3rd population quartiles, variation
across MSAs in supply response is consistent with the predictions that fol-
low from the organizational incentives discussed in section 1.1. Capacity
for all ownership types decreased in each group of MSAs, as one would ex-
pect in an industry generally characterized by substantial overcapacity.
For all ownership types except secular nonproﬁts, moreover, the percent-
age reduction in capacity is markedly greater in the slow-growing MSAs
than in the fast-growing MSAs. For example, for-proﬁt capacity in areas in
the 2nd population quartile shrank by 26.8 percent in fast-growing MSAs,
but by 37.8 percent slow-growing MSAs. For secular nonproﬁt hospitals,
however, not only is the relative rate of capacity reduction in fast- versus
slow-growing MSAs much smaller than the relative rate of contraction for
the other three ownership forms, but the absolute rate of contraction in
fast-growing MSAs is actually higher than the rate of contraction in slow-
growing MSAs.
The rates of capacity change in the most and least populous MSA quar-
tiles present a more complex pattern. In particular, table 1.3 shows that,
among the most populous MSAs, for-proﬁt hospitals exited the faster-
growing MSAs at a slightly faster rate than they exited slower-growing
MSAs. At the same time, for-proﬁt hospitals actually expanded capacity in
the slowest growing MSAs in the least populous quartile. Both these results
are consistent with a wholesale shift by for-proﬁt hospitals from the largest
urban areas to smaller MSAs, regardless of expected trends in demand. The
ﬁgures for the least populous quartile of MSAs, including particularly the
large percentage increase in for-proﬁt capacity that appears there, are also
aﬀected by the small number of institutions from which the ﬁgures are com-
puted: The quartile of least populous MSAs contains dramatically fewer
hospital beds than does the quartile containing the most populous MSAs.
The fact that the response to changing demand of hospitals of diﬀerent
ownership types diﬀers depending on the characteristics of the cities in
which they are located motivates our regression models. Those models
identify the eﬀects of changing demand on capacity based on within-MSA
variation in population rather than on variation across MSAs to control
for such unobserved diﬀerences in hospitals’ strategies. Speciﬁcally, we es-
timate the eﬀect, on zip-code-level measures of changes in capacity, of zip
code changes in demand and zip code hospital market characteristics,
holding constant MSA ﬁxed eﬀects. Descriptive statistics of all of the vari-
ables used in the regression analysis appear in table 1.4.
1.4 Results
Table 1.5 presents estimates of the eﬀect of population changes and
base-year hospital market characteristics on changes in diﬀerently owned
forms of hospital capacity from equation (1). For hospitals overall, and for
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Table 1.4 Characteristics of Zip Codes Used in Regression Analysis
Standard
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Capacity, 1985 12,753 24.754 19.274 0.420 275.842
Secular nonproﬁt capacity 12,753 13.877 12.846 0.000 127.115
Religious nonproﬁt capacity 12,753 5.018 7.114 0.000 148.047
For-proﬁt capacity 12,753 2.787 5.970 0.000 63.160
Public capacity 12,753 3.071 5.286 0.000 77.473
Log change in capacity 
1985–1994 12,753 –0.298 0.277 –4.465 4.041
Secular nonproﬁt capacity 12,253 –0.242 0.518 –5.795 4.502
Religious nonproﬁt capacity 11,010 –0.375 0.636 –6.010 6.194
For-proﬁt capacity 6,178 –0.277 0.655 –3.747 4.795
Public capacity 10,020 –0.411 0.769 –5.600 4.711
Log change in population, 
1985–1994 12,753 0.176 0.517 –4.736 6.581
Ln(beds per capita in 1985) 12,753 –1.921 1.420 –6.137 4.500
Very concentrated hospital 
market 12,753 0.371 0.483 0.000 1.000
Above-median density of 
for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt 12,753 0.441 0.497 0.000 1.000
Above-median density of 
public/nonproﬁt 12,753 0.479 0.500 0.000 1.000
Above-median density of large 
hospitals 12,753 0.400 0.490 0.000 1.000
Above-median density of 
teaching hospitals 12,753 0.410 0.492 0.000 1.000
Above-median density of 
system hospitals 12,753 0.484 0.500 0.000 1.000
each individual ownership type, responsiveness to increases in demand, as
proxied by population increases, is lower than responsiveness to decreases
in demand, controlling for other market characteristics. A 1 percent in-
crease in population leads to a 0.017 percent increase in overall capacity,
holding other factors constant, while a 1 percent population decrease leads
to a 0.095 percent decrease in overall capacity. This is what one would ex-
pect in an industry generally characterized by overcapacity.
Comparing the second through ﬁfth columns of the ﬁrst row of table 1.5
shows that responsiveness to increases in demand of secular nonproﬁts is
similar to that of religious nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt hospitals and rather
lower than that of public institutions. This is perhaps because the expan-
sionary incentives facing (the managers of) secular nonproﬁts, which—as
we have suggested above—are arguably greater than those present in the
other three ownership types, are counterbalanced by the greater diﬃculty
that secular nonproﬁts face in obtaining rapid access to capital.
Of primary interest to us here, however, is the relative responsiveness to
decreases in demand exhibited by hospitals under diﬀerent forms of own-ership. Here, the results in table 1.5 follow precisely the pattern that our
theoretical discussion would predict. For-proﬁt capacity is most respon-
sive to decreases in demand. The next most responsive are public capacity
and religious nonproﬁt capacity, for which the estimated coeﬃcients are
nearly identical. Secular nonproﬁt capacity is distinctly the least respon-
sive to decreases in demand, with a coeﬃcient that is less than half the co-
eﬃcient for public and religious nonproﬁt capacity and only one-third of
the coeﬃcient for the responsiveness of for-proﬁt capacity.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present estimates of equations (2) and (3), respec-
tively. Estimates of equation (2) from table 1.6 diﬀer from the estimates of
equation (1) from table 1.5 in that the former are calculated controlling
baseline (1985) total hospital capacity per elderly Medicare beneﬁciary.
Estimates of equation (3) from table 1.7 diﬀer from the estimates of equa-
tion (1) in table 1.5 in that the former are calculated controlling for base-
line hospital capacity plus baseline capacity interacted with the two popu-
lation change variables, producing estimates of the eﬀect of demand
responsiveness that vary with the level of baseline capacity.
Table 1.6 shows that, especially for both forms of nonproﬁt capacity, the
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Table 1.5 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994
Nonproﬁt
All Ownership
TypesS e cular Religious For-Proﬁt Public
Dln(pop), increases 0.017** 0.023** 0.017 0.033** 0.053**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Dln(pop), decreases 0.095** 0.043** 0.109** 0.146** 0.110**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Very concentrated  –0.014** 0.000 –0.023 –0.124** –0.117**
hospital market (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020)
Above-median density  –0.010 0.056** 0.013 –0.332** –0.233**
of for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.039) (0.026)
Above-median density  –0.021** 0.054** –0.044** –0.062** –0.261**
of public/nonproﬁt (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.019) (0.024)
Above-median density  0.029** 0.047** 0.032** 0.015 –0.059**
of large hospitals (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Above-median density  0.010* 0.029** 0.001 0.019 0.125**
teaching hospitals (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020)
Above-median density  –0.003 0.021** –0.008 –0.133** 0.004
of system hospitals (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
Notes: Dependent variable is zip-code-level ln(1994 capacity) – ln(1985 capacity). Standard errors are
in parentheses. Number of zips with nonmissing change in capacity for all ownership types is 12,753; for
secular nonproﬁt, 12,252; for religious nonproﬁt, 11,010; for for-proﬁt, 6,178; and for public, 10,020.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.estimated responsiveness of capacity to increases in population grows
larger once baseline capacity is held constant. The results are similar for
the alternative speciﬁcation in table 1.7. In both tables 1.6 and 1.7, this in-
crease in responsiveness is oﬀset by a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of high
baseline capacity on the rate of growth in capacity. These are the results
one would expect: There is less need to expand capacity to meet growing
demand when the capacity in place is already unusually large.
The estimated responsiveness of capacity to population decreases re-
mains essentially unchanged from table 1.5 to table 1.6 for all forms of
ownership, even though baseline capacity is statistically signiﬁcantly cor-
related with population decreases, just as it is with population increases
(from analysis not in the table,   0.106 and   –0.047, respectively). One
possible interpretation is that areas with declining population are already
marked by suﬃcient overcapacity, that they are contracting as rapidly as
feasible (given organizational constraints), and that the added stimulus of
yet further overcapacity has no important eﬀect on the rate of contraction.
In table 1.7, the responsiveness of capacity to decreases in population
drops substantially for all ownership types. High-capacity areas are less re-
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Table 1.6 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994, Including
Controls for Baseline 1985 Capacity
Nonproﬁt
All Ownership
TypesS e cular Religious For-Proﬁt Public
Dln(pop), increases 0.026** 0.036** 0.044** 0.049** 0.056**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
Dln(pop), decreases 0.091** 0.037** 0.096** 0.142** 0.109**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Ln(beds per capita in  –0.006** –0.008** –0.017** –0.010** –0.002
1985) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Very concentrated  –0.014** 0.000 –0.022 –0.126** –0.117**
hospital market (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020)
Above-median density  –0.011 0.055** 0.010 –0.336** –0.234**
of for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.039) (0.026)
Above-median density  –0.021** 0.054** –0.043** –0.061** –0.261**
of public/nonproﬁt (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.019) (0.024)
Above-median density  0.029** 0.046** 0.031** 0.018 –0.059**
of large hospitals (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Above-median density  0.010 0.029** 0.001 0.018 0.124**
teaching hospitals (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020)
Above-median density  –0.003 0.021** –0.008 –0.133** 0.004
of system hospitals (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
Notes:See notes to table 1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level ln(1994 capacity) – ln(1985 capacity).
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.sponsive to decreases in demand than are low-capacity areas, likely due to
the same factors—not captured in these models—that were responsible
for the high capacity to begin with.
Table 1.8 presents estimates of equation (4), which allows the eﬀects on
capacity of increases and decreases in population to vary by hospital mar-
ket characteristics. For-proﬁt hospitals adjust to demand contractions
much more rapidly when the market is concentrated, as do religious non-
proﬁts (to a much lesser extent). Secular nonproﬁt hospitals, in contrast,
do not respond diﬀerently to demand contractions in concentrated versus
unconcentrated markets.5 One possible interpretation is that individual in-
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Table 1.7 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994, Including
Controls for Baseline 1985 Capacity and Capacity/Population Interactions
Nonproﬁt
All Ownership
TypesS e cular Religious For-Proﬁt Public
Dln(pop), increases 0.039** 0.046** 0.051** 0.068** 0.062**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
Dln(pop), decreases 0.034** 0.004 0.087** 0.034 0.059**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019)
Interactions between ln(population) and ln(beds per capita) in 1985
Dln(pop), increases* –0.017** –0.016** –0.025** –0.022** –0.026**
Ln(beds/cap in 1985) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Dln(pop), decreases* –0.035** –0.024** –0.004 –0.049** –0.026**
Ln(beds/cap in 1985) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Ln(beds per capita in  –0.007** –0.007** –0.011** –0.012** 0.000
1985) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Very concentrated  –0.010 0.003 –0.018 –0.121** –0.111**
hospital market (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
Above-median density  –0.010 0.056** 0.010 –0.334** –0.231**
of for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.038) (0.026)
Above-median density  –0.022** 0.053** –0.044** –0.057** –0.261**
of public/nonproﬁt (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024)
Above-median density  0.031** 0.048** 0.033** 0.016 –0.055**
of large hospitals (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Above-median density  0.012* 0.030** 0.005 0.023 0.128**
teaching hospitals (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020)
Above-median density  –0.005 0.019** –0.010 –0.136** 0.000
of system hospitals (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
Notes:See notes to table1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level ln(1994 capacity) – ln(1985 capacity).
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
5. In results not presented in the table, we also reestimated equation (4) with controls for
baseline 1985 capacity per capita (as we did for equation [1], with results in table 1.5), which
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Table 1.8 Diﬀerential Eﬀects of Increases and Decreases in Population on Changes in
Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994, by Characteristics of Hospital Market in 1985
Nonproﬁt
All Ownership
TypesS e cular Religious For-Proﬁt Public
Dln(pop), increases 0.022 0.002 0.107** –0.216** –0.006
(0.014) (0.021) (0.028) (0.070) (0.055)
Dln(pop), decreases 0.126** 0.169** 0.034 0.116 0.054
(0.020) (0.030) (0.043) (0.105) (0.082)
Interactions between ln(population) and characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Very concentrated mkt   0.044** –0.010 –0.123** 0.131** 0.086**
ln(population increase) (0.013) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.034)
Very concentrated mkt   0.124** –0.037 0.078** 0.682** 0.023
ln(population decrease) (0.016) (0.028) (0.039) (0.048) (0.038)
High for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt   –0.032** –0.013 –0.056** 0.097 0.001
ln(population increase) (0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.066) (0.036)
High for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt   0.083** 0.085** –0.022 –0.254** 0.132**
ln(population decrease) (0.015) (0.024) (0.030) (0.105) (0.042)
High public/nonproﬁt   –0.001 0.012 0.035 0.096** –0.005
ln(population increase) (0.010) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.047)
High public/nonproﬁt   –0.075** –0.088** 0.106** 0.035 –0.041
ln(population decrease) (0.015) (0.023) (0.029) (0.046) (0.074)
High density of large   –0.026** 0.024 –0.023 –0.116** –0.052*
ln(population increase) (0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031)
High density of large   –0.036** –0.054** 0.111** –0.084** 0.091**
ln(population decrease) (0.014) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
High density of teaching   –0.009 –0.004 –0.084** 0.058* 0.027
ln(population increase) (0.012) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032) (0.036)
High density of teaching   –0.067** –0.123** –0.053 0.171** –0.084**
ln(population decrease) (0.016) (0.026) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042)
High density of system   0.027** 0.025 –0.003 0.133** 0.085**
ln(population increase) (0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032)
High density of system   –0.019 –0.013 –0.042* 0.195** –0.089**
ln(population decrease) (0.012) (0.019) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033)
Note: See notes to table 1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level ln(1994 capacity) – ln(1985 capacity).
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
stitutions internalize more of the gains from capacity reduction when they
have a larger market share—and thus have a stronger incentive to eliminate
excess capacity in such circumstances—but only if the institutions value
proﬁtability above size and survival, which is presumably true of for-proﬁt
hospitals but may not be true of secular nonproﬁts. Diﬀerences by owner-
ship status in the response of capacity to population increases in concen-
trated versus unconcentrated markets follow a diﬀerent pattern. For-proﬁt
and public hospitals adjust to demand increases statistically signiﬁcantly
more rapidly in concentrated markets, whereas religious nonproﬁts adjust
to demand increases statistically signiﬁcantly less rapidly, reﬂecting theOwnership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry 63
Table 1.9 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in Total Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994
Cause of Change in Dependent Variable
Opens/ Mergers/ Changes in
Closes Conversions Spinoﬀs Bed Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dln(pop), increases 0.007** 0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Dln(pop), decreases 0.000 0.001 –0.002 0.089**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Very concentrated  0.004** 0.000 0.005** –0.027**
hospital market (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Above-median density of  –0.007** –0.012** 0.011** 0.000
for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Above-median density of  –0.004** –0.008** 0.007** –0.013**
public/nonproﬁt (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Above-median density of  0.010** –0.001 –0.002 0.017**
large hospitals (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Above-median density  –0.011** 0.002 0.015** 0.003
teaching hospitals (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Above-median density of  –0.005** 0.000 –0.014** 0.015**
system hospitals (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Notes:See notes to table 1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level change in ln(capacity) due to the listed
cause of change.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
conﬂicting incentives for and constraints on expansion of hospitals of
diﬀerent ownership statuses discussed above.
Tables 1.9 through 1.13 present estimates of equation (1) analogous to
those in table 1.4, but decomposed by the source of the change in capacity.
Each table decomposes the changes in a single ownership form’s capacity
into four exhaustive and mutually exclusive sources: opens and closes, con-
versions, mergers and spinoﬀs, and changes in bed size.6 Table 1.9 gives re-
sults for hospital capacity in aggregate. The exhaustive and exclusive na-
ture of the decomposition is reﬂected in the fact that the coeﬃcients across
columns in table 1.9 add to approximately the coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst col-
umn of table 1.2. Tables 1.10 through 1.13 give results for each ownership
form taken separately.
Table 1.9 indicates that, as means of responding to both increases and
decreases in demand, neither conversions nor mergers and spinoﬀs are sig-
6. The eﬀects of population (and other covariates) on changes in an ownership form’s capac-
ity due to diﬀerent causes do not necessarily average to the total eﬀects on that ownership form
because a zip code’s percentage change in the (counterfactually constructed) capacity due to the
four causes does not necessarily average to a zip code’s total percentage change in capacity.niﬁcant vehicles for all forms of ownership in aggregate. This is not sur-
prising since those transactions do not in themselves lead to any change in
aggregate capacity, although they can be the occasion for change. More in-
teresting is the result that opens and closes, but not changes in bed size, are
signiﬁcant means of responding to increases in demand. One reason for
this pattern may be that areas with increasing population are often newly
developed sections of MSAs that are far from existing facilities and hence
not easily served by expanding those facilities; rather, new facilities must
be built to serve those areas. Another reason may be that, with changes in
technology, it is often easier to build an entirely new facility than to expand
an existing one.
The most surprising result in table 1.8, however, is that only changes in
bed size, not opens and closes, are a signiﬁcant means of reducing aggre-
gate hospital capacity in response to decreases in demand. This result is
due to the fact (as seen in tables 1.9 and 1.10) that both secular and reli-
gious nonproﬁt hospitals use reductions in bed capacity much more than
closure of facilities to respond to decreasing demand, consistent with the
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Table 1.10 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in Nonproﬁt Secular Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994
Cause of Change in Dependent Variable
Opens/ Mergers/ Changes in
Closes Conversions Spinoﬀs Bed Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dln(pop), increases 0.006** 0.003 0.003 0.009*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Dln(pop), decreases 0.005** 0.001 –0.011 0.079**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Very concentrated  0.006** 0.012** 0.001 –0.021**
hospital market (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Above-median density of  –0.003 0.020** 0.015** –0.018**
for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Above-median density of  0.004** 0.028** 0.001 –0.016**
public/nonproﬁt (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Above-median density of  0.005** 0.026** –0.013** 0.020**
large hospitals (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Above-median density  –0.009** –0.010** 0.020** 0.017**
teaching hospitals (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Above-median density of  0.001 –0.015** –0.010** 0.025**
system hospitals (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Notes:See notes to table 1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level change in ln(capacity) due to the listed
cause of change.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.strong managerialist bias against complete exit that theory suggests we
would ﬁnd at least among secular nonproﬁts.
At ﬁrst glance, tables 1.10–1.13 appear to suggest that conversions are
not used to transform the ownership structure of beds in response to
demand changes: The values in column (2), in the ﬁrst and second rows
of tables 1.10–1.13, are small and statistically insigniﬁcant. However,
this may be an artifact of our limited deﬁnition of conversion (i.e., same
name and AHA identiﬁer in 1985 and 1994, but with a diﬀerent ownership
status), which may exclude some changes in control that were de facto con-
versions. Tables 1.10–1.13 hint that this may be the case. In areas of de-
creasing population, nonproﬁt capacity contracts through opens and
closes, while for-proﬁt and public hospitals actually expand capacity sig-
niﬁcantly through opens and closes, suggesting that some of the closes and
opens involved may actually be conversions. This ﬁnding underscores one
potential limitation of the analysis of tables 1.10–1.13: Any classiﬁcation
of changes in capacities into mutually exclusive categories necessarily in-
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Table 1.11 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in Nonproﬁt Religious Hospital Bed Capacity,
1985–1994
Cause of Change in Dependent Variable
Opens/ Mergers/ Changes in
Closes Conversions Spinoﬀs Bed Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dln(pop), increases 0.004** –0.003 0.011** 0.004
(0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Dln(pop), decreases 0.002 0.007 0.018** 0.087**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Very concentrated  0.004** –0.013 0.034** –0.049**
hospital market (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
Above-median density of  0.010** –0.067** 0.008 0.049**
for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009)
Above-median density of  –0.011** –0.043** 0.048** –0.010
public/nonproﬁt (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Above-median density of  0.006** –0.011 0.012** –0.007
large hospitals (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Above-median density  –0.020** 0.000 0.023** –0.003
teaching hospitals (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Above-median density of  0.016** –0.007 –0.022** 0.010
system hospitals (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Notes:See notes to table 1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level change in ln(capacity) due to the listed
cause of change.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.volves some arbitrary decisions that may not reﬂect the complex realities
of the changing structure of the hospital industry.
1.5 Conclusion
Numerous empirical studies have sought to identify how diﬀerences in
the incentives facing managers of nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt ﬁrms lead to
diﬀerences in economic performance.7 Many of these studies have taken
the hospital industry as their focus. Depending on the dimension of per-
formance examined, these studies have reported both similarities and
diﬀerences across ownership forms.8We have focused here on a largely neg-
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Table 1.12 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in For-Proﬁt Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994
Cause of Change in Dependent Variable
Opens/ Mergers/ Changes in
Closes Conversions Spinoﬀs Bed Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dln(pop), increases 0.015** –0.010 0.004 0.020**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Dln(pop), decreases –-0.017** –0.006 0.003 0.145**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Very concentrated  –0.009 –0.049** –0.048** 0.000
hospital market (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Above-median density of  0.000 –0.161** –0.005 –0.003
for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.010) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
Above-median density of  –0.003 –0.010 –0.007 –0.035**
public/nonproﬁt (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
Above-median density of  –0.005 –0.028** 0.031** 0.030**
large hospitals (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Above-median density  –0.021** 0.016* 0.032** –0.006
teaching hospitals (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Above-median density of  –0.031** 0.012 –0.088** –0.025**
system hospitals (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Notes:See notes to table 1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level change in ln(capacity) due to the listed
cause of change.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
7. See Scott-Morton, Podolny, and Podolny (2001) for work on the related question: how
diﬀerences in the incentives of hobbyist versus professional managers lead to diﬀerences in
price and quality in the California wine industry.
8. Compare, for example, Kessler and McClellan (2002), who ﬁnd that areas with a pres-
ence of for-proﬁt hospitals have lower levels of hospital expenditures but virtually the same
patient health outcomes, to Duggan (2000), who ﬁnds that nonproﬁt ﬁrms responded as
strongly as for-proﬁt ﬁrms to a California program that greatly increased immediate ﬁnancial
incentives to treat the indigent.lected aspect of performance—rapidity of exit—where diﬀerences in be-
havior between nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt hospitals seem likely to be unusu-
ally pronounced and where those diﬀerences may have important implica-
tions for the overall structure and performance of the industry.
Managers of for-proﬁt hospitals and, to a lesser degree, also managers
of public hospitals and of religiously aﬃliated nonproﬁt hospitals may
have incentives to minimize costs of service and hence to eliminate un-
used or underused capacity. Managers of unaﬃliated nonproﬁt institu-
tions, in contrast, may not feel such an incentive so long as net cash ﬂow
does not become negative. Consequently, it is a plausible hypothesis that
such nonproﬁt hospitals adjust capacity much more slowly than do for-
proﬁt ﬁrms in response to reductions in demand, eﬀectively serving as
capital traps.
The results presented here provide strong support for that hypothesis.
For-proﬁt hospitals are the most responsive to reductions in demand, fol-
lowed in turn by public and religiously aﬃliated nonproﬁt hospitals, while
secular nonproﬁts are distinctly the least responsive of the four ownership
types. Our results do not support the hypothesis that bureaucratic inertia
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Table 1.13 Eﬀect of Increases and Decreases in Population and 1985 Hospital-Market
Characteristics on Changes in Public Hospital Bed Capacity, 1985–1994
Cause of Change in Dependent Variable
Opens/ Mergers/ Changes in
Closes Conversions Spinoﬀs Bed Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dln(pop), increases 0.008* 0.041** –0.004 –0.003
(0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008)
Dln(pop), decreases –0.008* –0.019* 0.000 0.106**
(0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008)
Characteristics of hospital market in 1985
Very concentrated  0.044** –0.101** 0.011** –0.018
hospital market (0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.011)
Above-median density of  –0.019** –0.105** 0.007 –0.063**
for-proﬁt/nonproﬁt (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.015)
Above-median density of  –0.029** –0.155** –0.018** 0.006
public/nonproﬁt (0.007) (0.018) (0.005) (0.013)
Above-median density of  0.044** –0.070** –0.040** 0.047**
large hospitals (0.006) (0.014) (0.004) (0.010)
Above-median density  0.029** 0.088** 0.013** –0.083**
teaching hospitals (0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.011)
Above-median density of  0.018** 0.001 0.003 –0.015
system hospitals (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.010)
Notes:See notes to table 1.5. Dependent variable is zip-code-level change in ln(capacity) due to the listed
cause of change.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.and multiple stakeholders make public hospitals uniformly less responsive
to market forces than their nonproﬁt counterparts.
It follows that if excess capacity is a continuing social problem in the
hospital sector, then the high density of nonproﬁt ﬁrms, which are the
legacy of a very diﬀerent era of hospital technology and ﬁnancing, may be
in large part responsible. This suggests, in turn, that encouraging exit by
nonproﬁt institutions, particularly by secular nonproﬁts, may enhance
eﬃciency. For example, the withdrawal of federal, state, and local tax ex-
emption from nonproﬁt hospitals, or at least from those that do not pro-
vide substantial amounts of uncompensated care, much as federal tax
exemption was withdrawn from nonproﬁt health insurance companies
in 1986, could lead to a reallocation of assets to more productive uses. Al-
ternatively, facilitating conversion to more cost-sensitive forms of or-
ganization by altering the corporate law ﬁduciary duties of nonproﬁt
directors to deny them the right to “just say no” to acquisition oﬀers
from other ﬁrms, and particularly from for-proﬁt ﬁrms (Hansmann 1996a,
2000), could accomplish the same goal. The latter reform would restrict the
defensive tactics available to the managers of nonproﬁt corporations even
more severely than those available to the managers of business corpora-
tions. Given, however, that nonproﬁt institutions by their nature are rela-
tively insensitive to market pressures for exit, more expansive legally im-
posed ﬁduciary duties may be socially optimal.
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